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FEDERAL TAX LIENS AND SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: ACCOMMODATION
OR ABDICATION?
Barbara Ashley Phillips*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1866, the federal tax lien has arisen in secret upon little
more than an administrative signature.1 It attaches to all the tax-
payer's property,2 real or personal,8 tangible or intangible,
4 in
existence or subsequently acquired. 5 Three events create the lien:
* Mrs. Phillips is a graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, and Yale
Law School. She is a member of the bars of California and Oregon, and is currently
engaged in practice in San Francisco with the firm of Patrick, Buchanan & Phillips.
She is a former Assistant United States Attorney specializing in civil tax litigation and
a former lecturer in taxation at Golden Gate College School of Law.
1 Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 107, carried forward as Rev. Stat. § 3186
(1875). This statute was amended and later codified in INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch.
36, § 3670, 53 Stat. 448 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321). See, 26 U.S.C.
§ 6321 (1968).
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321 provides as follows:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addi-
tion to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in
addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all prop-
erty and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such
person.
One line of defense against the tax lien is that that taxpayer has "no property"
in the asset in question, to which the tax lien can attach. See the discussion, infra,
in notes 126 & 146.
8 Id. The lien attaches to personal property without necessity for levy, e.g., Glens
Falls Ins. Co. v. Stoetzl, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9308 (E.D. Cal. 1966) [tax lien held
superior without levy to subsequent judgment lien with respect to claim assigned to
taxpayer]; Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945) [tax lien defeated
subsequent attachment lien with respect to money coming due taxpayer for services,
without necessity for prior distraint or levy].
4 E.g., Seaboard Sur. Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1962) [rights
under a construction contract dependent on the contractor's performance]; United
States v. Hubbell, 323 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1963) [unliquidated cause of action for
tort]; Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. United States, 301 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1962) [liquor license]; Bensinger v. Davidson, 147 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Cal. 1956)
[contract purchaser's cause of action for restitution against vendor of real property];
United States v. McFaddin Express, 197 F. Supp. 289 (D. Conn. 1967) [franchise
certificate of public convenience and necessity]; United States v. Rochelle, Jr., 384
F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 [cache of swindler]; United
States v. Wiltse, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9415 (C.D. Cal. 1968) [fraudulently conveyed
real estate, on theory title constructively remained in taxpayer]. See also, cases cited
in note 11 infra.
5 Glass City Bank v. United States, supra note 3; Fried v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 241 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957) [in enforcement
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assessment, demand upon the taxpayer, and his failure to pay." Once
these events occur, the lien attaches as of the assessment date.7 A
filed notice of lien is required only to assure the United States'
priority over a holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, pur-
chaser, or judgment lien creditor. 8
Once the United States obtains a lien upon the taxpayer's
property, no one can acquire an interest in it greater than what he
holds at that moment, except by Congressional grace. In effect the
property has two owners, the taxpayer and the United States.9
Once a federal tax lien has attached, the taxpayer cannot affect nor
destroy the rights of the United States. 10 Nor can a third party
proceeding, monthly disability payments under insurance contract contingent upon con-
tinued life of the insured held subject to federal tax lien]. This rule was undisturbed
by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1966). S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
6 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6303(a), provides for notice and demand for the
tax, and it has been held that the demand itself must be in proper form. United
States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1961).
7 North Gate Corp. v. North Gate Bowl, Inc., 149 N.W.2d 651 (Wis. 1967)
[once notice and demand were made, the tax lien was held entitled to priority as of
the earlier assessment date].
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6322, provides as follows:
Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by sec-
tion 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue
until the liability for the amount so assessed (or a judgment against the tax-
payer arising out of such liability) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by
reason of lapse of time.
The lien is not itself subject to any diminution in status because of its general
character or potentially related back perfection. The lien is perfect, under the law
of its creator, from its inception. Glass City Bank v. United States, supra note 3;
United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1941). See text, infra
following note 26.
8 The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323 as amended
by Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101 (Nov. 2, 1966), 80 Stat. 1125 [hereinafter cited as
"The Act"]. Filing of a notice of tax lien is now called "tax lien filing," INT. RV.
CODE of 1954, § 6323(h) (5). The United States may also achieve priority through
service of levy, which in effect reduces the property subject to a levy to possession
by the United States. See, Bolling v. Samples, 117 Ga. App. 38, 159 S.E.2d 727
(1967) [where United States was not a party, tax lien held superior to lien of
assignee arising after issuance and before service of levy, as to accounts receivable];
United States v. Plez Lewis & Son, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Mo. 1967) [notice
of levy determined order of priority, as to federal tax lien]. Levy is particularly
effective against trustee in bankruptcy, because it deprives the taxpayer of possession
and title to property. Groggin v. California Labor Div., 336 U.S. 118 (1949).
9 United States v. City of Greenville, supra note 7.
10 See, Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CAUa. L.
REV. 241, 251 (1953). Even death of the taxpayer cannot decrease previously fixed
rights under a federal tax lien. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56 (1958) [United
States liens on cash surrender value of life insurance policy on life of taxpayer sur-
vived his demise, notwithstanding state law to the contrary, and were recovered from
the proceeds]. See also, Seaboard Sur. Co. v. United States, supra note 4 [tax lien
prevailed over subsequent trustee's lien for expense of administering taxpayer's con-
tract proceeds]; Citizens Bank of Barstow, Tex. v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380, 382 (10th
Cir. 1940) [claim for work, labor and materials; tax lien defeated subsequent assign-
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impair them by judgment unless the United States is a party to the
proceeding."
Over the years Congress has protected a growing list of in-
terests against this secret lien, but it has left it to the courts to
define the scope of protection. In doing so, the courts developed a
federal test for perfection of competing interests-"choateness."' 2
Choateness may be illustrated by reviewing the problems of
consensual lienholders before the Federal Tax Lien Act was enacted
in 1966. Under prior law, a federal tax lien was invalid against
mortgagees and pledgees until notice of the tax lien was filed. The
courts required that interests be perfected under state law, that
they be fixed and certain as to the amount of the obligation se-
cured, and that the identity of the property subject to the lien and
of the lienor be known.' 3 Furthermore, the creditor had to take all
ment]; Glass City Bank v.. United States, supra note 3; Bensinger v. Davidson, 147
F. Supp. 240, 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956) [cause of action for unjust enrichment; tax lien
defeated subsequent release]; In re Educational Equip., Inc., 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
1508 (C.D. Cal. 1968) [residence; tax lien defeated conveyance for creditors].
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939)
[judgment of foreclosure in suit by mortgagee senior to the tax lien held ineffective
against tax lien; sale was required by federal law which controlled the manner in
which tax liens might be removed]. All that is necessary is that the tax lien attach
when the taxpayer has "property." See discussion supra note 4 and infra note 146.
Carver v. Ferguson, 254 P.2d 44, case dismissed (Cal. App. 1953) [cause of action for
tort held to be property]. CAL. CIV. CODE § 14(3) (West 1954) [chose in action is
property]. United States v. Rentz, 213 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Iowa 1962) [cause of action
of contract held property subject to a federal tax lien]. Thereafter, the lien can only be
removed according to the procedures prescribed by federal law. See, e.g., INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 § 7403 and 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1964). United States v. Bluhm, 69-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9609 (1969) [tax lien survived foreclosure of junior real property tax lien
where United States not served under 28 U.S.C. § 2410].
12 The "choateness" test is generally traced to United States v. Security Trust &
Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) [attachment lien subordinated as "inchoate" to sub-
sequent federal tax lien filed prior to the date the attaching creditor obtained judgment
because attachment lien unenforceable under state law unless reduced to judgment
within the statutory period. It may also be explained by the rule of sovereign im-
munity.].
This federal concept of perfection was no innovation in the law. Rather, it re-
flected the static common law view that a security interest did not exist, at any given
time, except and to the extent that value has been given and security subjected to lien.
See a discussion of the departure from this concept in the chattel mortgage cases in
1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.3, at 27 (1965).
13 The following items were held unprotected against a federal tax lien because
rendered or incurred after tax lien filing: mortgagee's attorney's fees, real estate taxes,
Bond v. United States, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960) ;
fire insurance premiums and realty taxes, United States v. Lord, 155 F. Supp. 105
(D.N.H. 1957) ; mortgagee's attorney's fees in foreclosure; tax lien notice filed prior to
judgment, United States v. Pioneer American Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963) ; inter-
pleading plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees, R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F.
Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex. 1956), aff'd per curiam, sub noma. United States v. R. F. Ball
Constr. Co., 239 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 587 (1958);
accord, by 1966 Act, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(a), § 6323(b) (8); mortgagee-
attorney's lien for fees for service rendered after tax lien filing, United States v.
Ringler, 166 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1958). Priority was granted interest accruing
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steps necessary to perfect his interest before the tax lien notice was
filed.14
As it stood in 1966, the law appeared harsh and antiquated.
Certain kinds of interest and expenses necessary to preserve a
security interest were at the mercy of intervening federal tax liens.
It was becoming difficult to fit modern security interests into the
protected categories of "mortgagee, pledgee, judgment creditor, and
purchaser" which were the only interests entitled to filed notice of
the tax lien. And the law gave almost no protection whatever to
after-acquired property or future advances, once the lien notice was
filed, absent a well-defined purchase-money security interest. Thus,
the prudent lender had to check the public records before each dis-
bursement.
In 1966, at the urging of the Treasury, the American Bar
Association, and numerous business associations,'" Congress en-
acted a new statutory scheme of priorities for liens and interests
competing with federal tax liens." This law'7 assumes the continued
pre-eminence of the federal tax lien,'" but contains its own rules
for perfection of certain competing interests.19 It does not affect
many liens, such as certain liens of attorneys, attaching creditors
and landlords, and other statutory liens.20 It affects most consensual
after tax lien filing, even though at one time the Treasury argued for a contrary rule.
See United States v. Lord, 155 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1957).
14 R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., supra
note 13 [performance bond surety denied protection as to post-tax lien filing disburse-
ments]; Abramson v. Boedecker, 379 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1006 (1967) [holding under present law a bank's unrecorded assignment inferior to
subsequent federal tax lien]; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Foley, 278 F. Supp. 174 (D.N.Y.
1967), explained infra note 26.
15 Among the associations, United States Sav. & Loan League, Am. Land Title
Ass'n, Nat'l Lumber & Bldg. Material Dealers Ass'n, Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Boards,
Nat'l Ass'n of Mut. Say. Banks, Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of America, Nat'l League
of Insured Sav. Ass'n, Am. Bankers Ass'n, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of America, Nat'l
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, and Nat'l Small Business Ass'n.
16 See, the Act supra note 8.
17 INT REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323.
18 H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1966) contains the following
observation (emphasis supplied):
Under decisions of the Supreme Court a mortgagee, pledgee or judgment
creditor is protected at the time notice of the tax lien is filed if the identity
of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are
all established at such time. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S.
81 (1954). Except as otherwise provided, subsection (a) of new section 6323
retains this basic rule of federal law.
"9 H.R. REP. supra note 5. S. REP. supra note 5.
20 The amendments were immediately effective with few exceptions. See Pub. L.
No. 89-719, § 114 (Nov. 2, 1966), 80 Stat. 1125. Under prior and presumably con-
tinuing law, attaching creditors who obtain judgment after tax lien filing will continue
to be subordinate to an intervening tax lien. See United States v. Security Trust & Sav.
Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) [so held]. Landlord's liens, as in United States v. Scovil, 348
U.S. 218 (1955), and statutory or contractual attorneys' liens, as in United States v.
Ringler, 166 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1958) [attorney holding mortgage on business
assets to secure reasonable value, of services in contesting tax liability] presumably will
1969]
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liens immediately however, and it is to them that this paper is ad-
dressed.2
The game of lien priorities is rarely leap-frog, and great peace
of mind usually attends being first across the finish line. The trophy
in the winner's circle reads "First in time, first in right." But under
the 1966 Act, as under prior law, one gains nothing by being first
with an inchoate or imperfect lien. The subsequent federal tax lien
will prevail. The question is, what is an inchoate or imperfect lien.
A GUIDE TO THE STATUTE2 2
The 1966 tax lien priority statute cannot be interpreted without
an understanding of prior federal tax lien law. We have considered
be cut off by the making of an assessment (or for consensual liens qualifying as
"security interests" by tax lien filing) so that the rendition of services or occurrence
of contingencies upon which the liens are predicated after that date will be ineffectual
against the tax lien. See Brooks, Jr. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Ky.
1967) [lawyer's contingent fee rights held subordinate to intervening tax lien under
exception to INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 § 6323(b) (8)].
21 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(a), as amended. See also H.R. REP. and S.
REP., supra note 5. This paper does not address itself to INT. REV. CODE of 1954
§ 6324, relating to estate and gift taxes and the exceptions to them, notably interest
and expenses on prior liens and security interests, superpriority interests and mechan-
ic's liens.
22 The following is a brief outline of the tax lien priority statute, Pub. L. No.
89-719, § 101 (Nov. 2, 1966), 80 Stat. 1125, as it became effective on November 2,
1966:
Section 6323 (a)--accords priority over unfiled tax liens to purchasers, mechanic's
lienors, judgment lien creditors and holders of security interests. Prior law did as much
for "mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors."
Section 6323(b)-accords priority over filed federal tax liens to various classes of
persons without actual notice of the federal tax lien and to some with notice of the
lien. Under prior law, only a purchaser, mortgagee or pledgee of a security and the
purchaser of a motor vehicle were so protected. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 § 6323(a).
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 2, 4, 36.
Section 6323(c)-provides a limited priority with respect to property acquired by
the taxpayer or otherwise becoming security after notice of the tax lien is filed. There
was no provision in prior law for after-acquired property.
Section 6323(d)-provides a limited priority for subsequent disbursements with
respect to security existing when the tax lien is filed. Prior law contained no parallel
to this provision for future advances.
Section 6323(e)-is new and allows a priority for interest and expenses, provided
these are allowed the same priority under local law as a lien or interest entitled to
priority over a federal tax lien.
Section 6323(f)-states where a notice of tax lien must be filed to lien real and
personal property.
Section 6323(g)-provides for the renewal of aging tax lien notices by refiling of
the notice of lien, where because of a taxpayer's waiver or the suspension of the statute
of limitations, the 6-year life of the tax lien has been extended.
Section 6323 (h) -defines the terms used in the statute.
Section 6323(i)-defines actual notice, recognizes the right of subrogation and
authorizes the District Director to disclose the amount of an outstanding tax obligation
to interested persons.
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the evils which Congress intended to remedy and turn now to an
analysis of the overall statutory scheme it adopted. An understand-
ing of the statutory scheme is necessary to predict the outcome of
litigation under the Act and to identify aberrational decisions which
'cannot be relied upon.
The statute defines the interests it protects, the extent of their
protection, and tells how to perfect them. Competing interests do
not exist for tax lien priority purposes unless they meet these fed-
eral statutory requirements. Federal law controls except where
federal law makes state law definitions applicable.
The tax lien statute uses at least two techniques to obtain the
results it seeks: (1) it sets out explicitly the requirements for per-
fection of the interests it protects; (2) it carves out exceptions to
both statutory and judicial rules for perfection. The first technique
is used to accommodate future advances and after-acquired se-
curity.23 The second is used to provide for interest, expenses,2 4 and
the superpriorities (interests protected against filed tax liens) .25 In
both cases, the statute carefully defines qualifying interests.
23 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c), (d). See also discussion infra notes 60 & 65
et seq.
24 The protection of any lien or security interest may extend to interest or carry-
ing charges (including finance charges, service charges, and the like) upon the obliga-
tion secured, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(e)(2)-(6). H.R. REP., supra note 5, at
46-47.
Priority by subrogation is also recognized by section 6323(i) (2). There is no re-
requirement that amounts paid under this subsection be used to pay liens senior to the
one held by the payor, nor that the payments be necessary to protect his security. If
this section is read literally, it would be possible for a senior to increase the amount
of his priority over a federal tax lien for redemption purposes by payments to an
obstreperous, or for that matter, a friendly junior, whom he could foreclose out of the
property, provided only that the junior was also senior to the federal tax lien. Where
done in an effort to prevent the United States or other juniors from redeeming, non-
redeeming lienors might not be held to be "entitled to priority over the lien imposed
by section 6321."
The United States even though notified of a private foreclosure sale, has 120 days
within which to redeem the property, or such longer period as local law allows. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954 § 6337(b).
The priority of interest and expenses under INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 § 6323(c) is
derivative, and exists regardless of when the interest accrues, or the expenses are in-
curred. No separate perfection of these items is necessary but they are dependent upon
the establishment of a lien or interest which is prior to the tax lien of the United
States. Security agreements should provide for the inclusion of all such items within
the lien being created unless local law does so expressly; California law has not, since
1965. See Stats. 1965, 1379, page 3293, § 17, repealing CAL. COMM. CODE § 9312(7).
See also 2 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
U.C.C. § 2 1.05(2) (i) (1963).
25 The protection afforded the holder of a superpriority interest is similar to that
afforded under prior law to purchasers, mortgagees or pledgees of securities and to pur-
chasers of motor vehicles. The 1966 amendments enlarge the field of qualifying interests
to include others where reliance is placed by the market on possession of the property
or a tangible token of a property interest. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(b). Also
1969]
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A consensual lien must be perfected under local law against a
judgment lien creditor in order to be recognized for tax lien priority
purposes.26 Holders of "simple" security interests (good under the
protected are attorneys whose efforts create or procure property or funds, and de
minimis sales involving too little money to justify an argument over lien priorities. In
addition, the new protection of property tax liens in effect puts the United States in
the same position as other creditors who are subordinated to these liens under state law.
The superpriorities break down into two categories: those protected whether or
not the person secured has actual notice or knowledge of the tax lien and those who
are protected only if they are without actual notice or knowledge of the federal tax
lien at the time their liens or interests arise. Distinguish the notice of lien filing which
is relevant to the priority of consensual lien-holders not qualifying for a superpriority.
Ir. Ray. CODE of 1954 § 6323(a), (c), (d). See discussion in note 34 infra. Among
those protected only if they are without actual notice or knowledge of the federal tax
lien are
1. a purchaser of a security, a motor vehicle, or personal property at casual sale,
2. a person holding a security interest in a security,
3. an insurer lending on its life insurance,
4. or a passbook lender upon its own account.
A purchaser of personal property at retail will not be accorded his priority if by
his purchase he intends to interfere with the collection of Federal taxes, or if he knows
that his purchase will do so. However, actual notice of the tax lien is not, strictly
speaking, sufficient to defeat him. A purchaser at casual sale will be similarly defeated
by knowledge that the sale to him is one of a series of sales.
Also protected against previously-filed federal tax liens under section 6323(b) in
spite of actual notice or knowledge of the tax lien are those qualifying as
1. a holder of a possessory lien on tangible personal property,
2. a holder of a mechanic's lien for small repairs to residential real estate,
3. an attorney holding a charging lien upon property or funds he procures or
creates, as in Columbia Cas. Co. v. Consolidated Shipping Co., 276 F. Supp.
600 (E.D. La. 1967),
4. governmental bodies holding ad valorem and public improvements tax liens on
real property, or public service or utility service liens.
The date of tax lien filing is a matter of indifference to the superpriority interest
holders who meet the definitional requirements of INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(b).
A superpriority purchaser must still have perfected his interest against a subsequent
purchaser without actual notice. A holder of a security interest must still have per-
fected his interest against a judgment lien creditor. But there is no time limit within
which they must do so. Only if the person must be without actual notice or knowledge
of the tax lien, must he have satisfied the definitional requirements for a "purchaser"
or "holder" of a security "interest" before such notice or knowledge is acquired.
Attorneys' liens, consensual or nonconsensual, are protected only with respect to
judgments and amounts received in settlements, as against a previously filed federal tax
lien, or a tax lien arising during the period when the attorney is still rendering services.
This protection is broader than that allowed under the old creation of the fund rule,
in that it covers settlements. However, it does not cover fees of a plaintiff in inter-
pleader. See United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co:, supra note 13.
26 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 11-12. S. REP., supra note 5, at 13. See cases cited
supra note 14, and Bebber v. Mills Lumber Co., 429 P.2d 92 (Wyo. 1967) [employees
without artisan's or other lien inferior to United States as to goods produced]. See
also Calvin & Co. v. United States, 264 Cal. App. 2d 571, 70 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1968)
[United States tax lien held superior to lender's claim as to borrowed funds].
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h)(1) defines a security interest as one perfected
against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation. The Uniform
Commercial Code contains no statement of priorities between security interests within
its purview (security interests in personal property) and a judgment lien. The per-
fection required must, therefore, be determined under general law defining and limiting
[Vol. 10
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old "choateness" test) must take all steps necessary to that perfec-
tion before tax lien filing.27 And holders of commercial transactions
security interests may take some steps necessary to it after tax lien
filing.28 (Holders of superpriority interests are almost exempt from
perfection rules, but must meet rigid definitional requirements. See
discussion, supra, note 25.) The judgment lien creditor test is an
initial perfection required of virtually all consensual liens for tax
lien priority purposes. In this regard the House Report states that:
The priority granted a security interest over a Federal tax lien under
any provision of section 6323 or section 6324 is never greater than the
priority accorded such security interest, under local law, against a sub-
sequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation.
2 9
The United States under its tax liens is not limited to the rights
of a state-law judgment lien creditor. Under the 1966 law, as under
its predecessor, the preeminence and pervasiveness of the federal
tax lien is assumed. Once it exists, the federal tax lien is perfected
both as to real and personal property."0 And it is immune from
related-back perfection except as federal law provides.3
the property of a debtor which is subject to execution or otherwise available to
creditors under equity concepts such as fraud.
The judgment lien creditor test imposed on a consensual lien, therefore, is initially
whether it would on the date of tax lien filing defeat a judgment lien recorded under
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 674 (West 1954) or on which execution has been levied under
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 681(a) (West 1954).
The competing security interest in question must be tested under local creditors'
rights law for perfection interest as against the tax lien. This was the holding of the
District Court of Appeal in United States v. Strollo, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. fT 9142 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd sub nom Peninsula State Bank v. United States, 201
So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1968), involving a bank's competing security interest in a contract
assigned to it, and entered into by the debtor, after notices of tax lien had been filed.
See also Abramson v. Boedecker, supra note 14, cert. denied 389 U.S. 1006 [federal
tax lien held superior to bank's earlier unrecorded assignment. State law accorded
protection to lien creditors, under recording acts]; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Foley,
supra note 14 [United States held prior, under filed tax lien, to claim of materialman
as to materials delivered where latter had failed to exercise statutory right to repossess
before notice of lien was filed. Court rejected materialman's argument that debtor
had no property right in the materials to which the tax lien could attach]; United
States v. Masonry Contractors, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. IT 9184 (S.D. Tex. 1968) [federal
tax liens held superior to claim of bank creditor acquiring funds from taxpayer's
debtor after notice of the tax lien was filed].
27 See H.R. REP., supra note 18 and infra note 66. See also text following note
44 infra; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Stoetzl and Glass City Bank v. United States, supra
note 3. See contra, Peninsula State Bank v. United States, in!ra note 156.
28 See discussion in text following notes 54 and 69 and infra pp. 59 et seq. See
also discussion in notes 126 and 146 infra. "Superpriority" interests which enjoy
related-back perfection or escape perfection requirements entirely are defined primarily
in INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954 § 6323(b). See discussion in note 25 supra.
29 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 49.
30 Id.; see also Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, supra note 8.
81 See H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 35, 49. See also note 18 supra, and text follow-
1969]
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The lien priority provisions are-essentially an accommodation,
not an abdication. The United States is still a competing creditor
with a statutory edge, but the edge has become easier to live with
for the commercial lenders, manufacturers, and sellers who are the
chief beneficiaries of the 1966 amendments. By contrast, Congress
granted few concessions to innocent bystanders, other than pur-
chasers and repairmen of Lilliputian proportions, and contract
purchasers.
In many ways the new statute is akin to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, but it is folly to assume that the same terms have
the same meaning in both contexts. A security interest under sec-
tion 6323(h) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code includes real prop-
erty, whereas a Uniform Commercial Code security interest is lim-
ited to personal property and fixtures. 2 A purchaser under section
6323(h)(6) must have given "adequate and full consideration,"
not merely valuable consideration.38 The requirements for perfection
of an Internal Revenue Code-qualified security interest are stricter
than for a Uniform Commercial Code interest because related-back
perfection is not generally recognized. Future advances and after-
acquired property are provided for only in a limited way.3 4 But sec-
ing note 28 supra. But see, Carco Acceptance Corp. v. Kunze, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
f1 9607 (D.C. Neb. 1969) [purchase money security interest prevailed against prior tax
lien in spite of 7-day gap between release of security interest refiling in county. The
case concurs with the purchase money security cases but is wrongly explained on the
theory that the tax lien could not prevail because a judgment creditor could not
do so under state law. This theory wholly ignores Congressional limitations upon related
back perfection.].
82 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (37) (1958).
83 And a "purchaser" may now include a holder of "(A) a lease of property,
(B) a written executory contract to purchase or lease property, (C) an option to pur-
chase or lease property or any interest therein, or (D) an option to renew or extend
a lease of property, which is not a lien or security interest. . . ." H.R. REP., supra
note 5, at 50. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h) (6). United States v. Mitchell, 69-2
U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9524 (7th Cir. 1969) [allowing United States to set aside transfer
of taxpayer's interest in their home to his spouse in exchange for a mortgage on
both interests to pay taxes of lien on the property].
84 The statute defines a protected "agreement" as one providing for disburse-
ments made before actual notice of tax lien filing. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)
(2) (A), (d). This allows the lender to protect himself immediately upon actual notice
by ceasing to make further disbursements. If he comes within the commercial financ-
ing priority, he may then act in a more leisurely fashion to terminate substitution of
collateral and prevent dissipation of collateral acquired for a period up to 45 days fol-
lowing the tax lien filing.
This approach presupposes that the secured party has power under the security
agreement to discontinue disbursements or extensions of credit, once the filing of a
federal tax lien has been discovered. In the absence of such a contractual provision,
the secured party may be hard pressed indeed, as no provision will be made for his
protection against a filed federal tax lien, unless he comes within the relatively narrow
confines of the obligatory disbursements provisions, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323
(c) (4), which are inapplicable unless the obligation required by reason of the inter-
vention of the rights of a person other than the taxpayer. The burden is on the
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tion 6323(i) (1) defines "actual notice or knowledge" for purposes
of application to organizations in the language of the 1962 amend-
ment to section 1-201(27) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 5
WHERE To FIND NOTICE OF A FEDERAL TAX LIEN
The 1966 amendments 6 greatly simplified the search for a tax
lien in advance of extending credit or lending money. Notices of
federal tax liens affecting the taxpayer's personal property are filed
in only one place as are notices of liens affecting any given piece
of his real property. As before, to lien real property, notice of a
federal tax lien must be filed in the one office designated by the state
in which the property is located. 7 To lien personal property, notice
of lien must be filed in the one office designated by local law for
the filing of such notices to lien all the taxpayer's personal property,
whether or not within the state.8  This is generally the recorder's
office in the county where the taxpayer resides or where a corpora-
tion or partnership has its principal executive office.39 In states not
providing one and only one such office, notice will be filed with the
clerk of the United States District Court for the district in which
the taxpayer resides. 40
government to show the existence of actual notice or knowledge, according to the
Committee reports. H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 12, 50. S. REP., supra note 5, at 14.85 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 12, 50. S. REP., supra note 5, at 14.
86 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f).
87 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 6323(f) (1) (A) (i), (2)(A). As in California, this
is usually the office of the recorder for the county in which the property is located.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7200(a) (West Supp. 1968). State law will apparently control thedefinition of "real property." In a footnote to the discussion of the Act's definition
of "security interest," the Committee Reports state that "it is intended that what
becomes a part of realty is to be determined under local law." H.R. REP., supra note
5, at 11. S. REP., supra note 5, at 13. As to fixtures, see the cases cited infra note 97
et seq. See also, Elliott v. Sioux Oil Co., 191 F. Supp. 847 (D. Wyo. 1960) [same,
as to the beneficial interest in a trust consisting of real property].88 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f) (1) (A) (ii). INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f) (2)(B) governs the situs of personal property. See discussion of residence, infra
note 41. State law is apparently intended to govern what constitutes personal as well
as real property. Thus debts secured by a mortgage or trust deed on realty will bepersonal property, in "lien theory" states. United States v. Goldberg, 362 F.2d 575(3d Cir. 1966) [so held; federal tax liens of which notice was filed in the county
of the corporation's principal place of business took priority with respect to a note
and mortgage over subsequent assignee]; CAL. CIV. CODE § 2888 (West 1954) ; Martin
v. Becker, 169 Cal. 301, 146 P. 665 (1915); Hilliard v. Bank of America, 102 Cal.App. 2d 730, 228 P.2d 327 (1951); United States v. Cohen, 389 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1969). Contra, Harman v. Fairview Associates, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. II 9187 (1969).[This is not good law under the 1966 Act. The state must designate only one place
for filing to lien all personal property belonging to a taxpayer.]
39 In the case of a corporation or partnership, notices of federal tax liens are
to be filed with the Secretary of State to lien personal property. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 7200(b) (1) (West Supp. 1968).
40 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f)(1)(B). A notice of tax lien against tax-
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The 1966 Act is tricky however, in that it contains its own
definitions and relevant periods. For example, the situs of all per-
sonal property for tax lien notice filing purposes is deemed to be
the taxpayer's residence. 4 1 Furthermore, the time when the situs of
personal property is determined is the time when the notice of lien
is filed, not the time when the property is acquired.42 Thus, a lien
filed January 1, 1965, in State A where the taxpayer then resided,
would lien a piece of equipment acquired by him prior to January
31, 1971, in any state, regardless of his residence at the time of
acquisition. A refiling of notice of a tax lien would have to be both
in the place of original filing and where the taxpayer then resides
provided the Commissioner knows of the new residence (either
through written notice or a filed return) more than 90 days before
refiling.43 Accordingly, a prospective encumbrancer or purchaser of
personal property should verify the absence of tax lien filings wher-
ever the taxpayer (borrower or seller) resided over the preceding
six years and thirty days to virtually assure the priority of his
interest over a federal tax lien.44
BASIC PRIORITIES
Assuming that credit has been extended or a loan made in ig-
norance of a filed tax lien, what is the relative strength of the
security interest and the federal tax lien? Analysis of the priority
problems of the holder of a security interest begins with an exam-
payers residing outside the United States will be filed in the District of Columbia. INTr.
REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f) (1) (C).
41 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f) (2) (A) (i), (B). "Residence" is not defined
for purposes of application to individuals, but the term was adopted to avoid the con-
fusion under prior law over whether notice had to be filed at the taxpayer's domicile
(Rev. Rul. 60-350, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 394) or some other place. See W. PLUMB
& L. WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 55 (2d ed. 1967). S. REP., supra note 5, at 11. The
residence of a corporation or partnership is deemed the place at which the principal
executive office of the business is located, and the residence of the taxpayer whose
residence is outside the United States is deemed the District of Columbia. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 § 6323(f) (2).
42 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f) (1), (2) (B). In re De Angelis, 373 F.2d 755
(3d Cir. 1967) [so held].
43 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f) (1) (B). In the event of refiling as required
by section 6323(g) to preserve a previous filing, the Government is required to file
a notice of lien in the same office as before and in the office designated by the state
of taxpayer's new residence, provided the Secretary or his delegate had notice of the
new residence in writing 90 days or more before the date of refiling. Temporary rules
issued by the Commissioner set forth rather strict requirements for the necessary
"notice," and Congress gave the Commissioner power to determine the manner of
giving notice. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(f)(2)(B) and Treas. Reg. § 400.1-
1(c)(2) (1967).
44 Only if the Secretary or his delegate failed to receive notice of the taxpayer's
change of residence in writing 90 days or more prior to refiling would such a check
fail to protect a prospective encumbrancer or purchaser.
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ination of the state of affairs existing when the notice of tax lien
is filed. This date of "tax lien filing" is the key to determining
whether and to what extent a consensual lien is prior in time to a
federal tax lien. This is the first cut-off point for determining the
perfection and extent of the security interest, 45 and also of judgment
liens, purchasers' interests,46 and to a lesser extent, mechanic's
liens.47
Specifically, we must answer the following questions:
1. At the date of tax lien filing, was there a written agree-
ment covering this transaction in existence?
If no written agreement existed when the tax lien was filed,
there can be no priority for future advances or after-acquired prop-
erty since these are identified on the date of tax lien filing,48 absent
a superpriority.49
2. At the date of tax lien filing, had the holder of the security
interest taken all steps necessary to the perfection of his
interest against a judgment lien creditor under state law?
If all steps necessary to the perfection of a security interest
under state law have not been taken when the tax lien is filed, only
45 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(a),(h) (1).
46 Id. § 6323(a),(h) (6).
47 A mechanic's lien is perfected with respect to real property for tax lienpriority purposes whenever it becomes perfected under local law against subsequent
purchasers without actual notice, but no earlier than the date on which the lienor
first begins to supply labor, services, or materials. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h) (2). Unlike the security interest, there is no requirement that the "consideration"
for the lien be supplied before notice of the tax lien is filed. In other words, the
statute accepts an otherwise inchoate lien for purposes of determining priority as
against the federal tax lien. A bonded stop notice lienor is protected by this rule,
with respect to construction loan funds. Shore Block v. Lakeview Apts., 377 F.2d
835 (3d Cir. 1967). For cases finding priority on an "equitable lien" theory, see
discussion in notes 126 & 153 infra.
48 Relation-back of perfection to the time the security interest attaches by the
subsequent filing of a financing statement or taking possession of the security is not
recognized for tax lien priority purposes except in the commercial transactions (INT.
REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)) and superpriorities area (INT. REV. CODE of 1954§ 6323(b)). H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 11-12. S. REP., supra note 5, at 13. The com-
mercial transactions provisions require a written agreement entered into prior to tax
lien filing as a prerequisite to the protection of after-acquired property and future
advances, except in the relatively narrow exceptions provided for certain superpriorities,
discussed in note 25 supra. See contra, Peninsula State Bank v. United States, infra
note 158. The statutory rule was adopted in Abramson v. Boedecker, supra note 14.
See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Foley, supra note 14 [materials unrepossessed at
tax lien filing] and United States v. Kamieniecki, 261 F. Supp. 683 (D.N.H. 1966)[attempted bank set-off of unsecured loans against Certificate of Deposit after tax
lien filing]. Oregon v. Magnolia Lumber Co., 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9591 (Cir. Ct. Ore.
1967) [same, as to amount of subsequent judgment in damage action against taxpayer-
mortgagee by mortgagor].
49 See note 25 supra.
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a commercial financing security interest or superpriority is entitled
to any priority whatever for after-acquired property and future ad-
vances." For example, assume that a security interest is perfected
against another security interest in the same manner as it is per-
fected against a judgment lien. As a simple security interest it could
not be perfected against a federal tax lien in accounts receivable
or contract rights until a financing statement had been filed. 5 And
while a similar filing or possession would accord protection to a
security interest in goods, chattel paper or documents, possession
would be necessary to the perfection of a simple security interest
in an instrument.52
A commercial transactions security interest may enjoy tempo-
rary perfection as provided for by the Commercial Code, if the
temporary perfection does not jeopardize the interest's immunity
against a judgment creditor obtaining a lien on the date of tax lien
filing. However, this is only true if perfection is achieved within the
45-day or other period provided by the tax lien statute, and does
not prevent the interest from meeting the law's other conditions.
5 3
3. What disbursements were made prior to the time of filing
of the notice of federal tax lien?
While these disbursements may be secured without question
for tax lien priority purposes, priority for post-tax lien filing dis-
bursements generally depends upon lack of actual notice of the tax
lien filing.54
4. What security was in existence and had been acquired by
the taxpayer prior to the time of tax lien filing?
Late perfection of the security interest in specific property
because of delay in the debtor's acquisition of rights in the collateral
is provided for only in the commercial transactions (or superprior-
ity) provisions. The commercial transactions exceptions allow prior-
ity in collateral acquired within 45 days after tax lien filing for
certain interests created by commercial transactions financing agree-
ments.55 And an even longer acquisition period is allowed certain
50 See text following note 25 supra and notes 64 & 154 infra.
"' CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9302, 9304 (West 1964); in re Far W. Asphalt Paving
Co., 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9646 (D. Ariz. 1969).
52 CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9304(1), 9305 (West 1964). With respect to instruments,
this is true because there is no temporary or related-back perfection. However, security
interests in securities are entitled to superpriority treatment. See note 25 supra.
53 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2), discussed infra notes 75 & 150. But see,
Carco Acceptance Corp. v. Kunze, note 31 supra.
54 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(d) and text following note 66 infra; see
also discussion in notes 25 (superpriorities) and 24 (interest and expenses) supra; and
following note 24.
55 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)(2), discussed infra notes 75 & 150.
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obligatory disbursements agreements and real property construction
or improvement agreements (including crop and livestock loans)."
However, a simple security interest does not extend to property not
in existence when the notice of tax lien is filed."7
THE CONCEPT OF A "SECURITY INTEREST" UNDER THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
In General
The Tax Lien Act of 1966 codifies the prior judicial test of
choateness for competing liens. Under this test, a "simple" security
interest is protected to the same extent as a mortgage or pledge
under prior law.58 Statutory exceptions to the "choateness" test in-
clude the superpriorities and the commercial transactions provi-
sions.59
A "simple" security interest' exists only in existing property
in which has been created a security interest good under local law
against a subsequent judgment lien creditor.61 The existence of the
security interest refers to the perfection required, the disbursements
made, and the property claimed as security. A similar test for per-
fection is applied under the Internal Revenue Code (all references
herein to IRC refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 1968
edition) to judgment lien creditors, who must have acquired theirjudgment liens prior to the date of tax lien filing.62
An IRC-qualified security interest does not always include
many types of interests-notably rights not yet earned or condi-
tioned upon an event which has not occurred-which would be sub-
56 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3) and (4), discussed infra note 94 and
following note 134.
57 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h) (1). See infra pp. 59 et seq. for a discussion
of the Internal Revenue Code limitations on qualifying property.
58 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(b),(c).
59 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(a),(h)(1). See discussion following note 25
supra.
60 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(a),(h) (1).61 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h)(1)--"Security Interest. The term 'security
interest' means any interest in property acquired by contract for the purpose of
securing payment or performance of an obligation or indemnifying against loss orliability. A security interest exists at any time (A) if, at such time, the property is
in existence and the interest has become protected under local law against a sub-
sequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation, and (B) to the extent
that, at such time, the holder has parted with money or money's worth." (emphasis
supplied). Note that only consensual interests are protected as security interests.
62 The perfection required of a judgment lien is implicit in the phrase "judgment
lien creditor" which replaces the appellation under prior law, "judgment creditor."
H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 36; see also discussion, supra note 26.
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ject to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 0 And the IRC
security interest does not generally exist until all events necessary
to its perfection have occurred, unlike the Commercial Code.64
These are the most important differences between the two statutes.65
The test for perfection of a "simple" security interest and a
judgment lien might be called an "all events" test, since after tax
lien filing nothing the lienor can do will increase the amount of his
security nor the extent of disbursements secured against the tax
lien, nor the perfection of the security interest or judgment lien
except as provided in section 6323.66 The chart on the following
pages illustrates the point that a simple security interest encom-
passes pre-tax-lien-filing--i.e., Time 1-disbursements and security
only. See example "A."
Under the so-called 45-day exception,67 this interest is stretched
to include protection for disbursements made before the 46th day
after tax lien filing and before actual notice of that filing.6" The chart
refers to this as "Time 3." See example "D." Under this exception,
63 The limitations upon property which can be the subject of an Internal Rev-
enue Code security interest are discussed infra p. 59. However, most vulnerable is "any
interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights" (UNIFORM CoM-
MERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (37)) to the extent these are not in existence at the critical
time. Rights in proceeds which are different from the property which gives rise to
them, such as proceeds from the sale of inventory, unless and until these come into
existence are likewise unsatisfactory. However, for a novel approach to the "qualified
property" problem, see Harter v. District Director, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5091
(E.D. Wash. 1968) [assignment of amounts falling due (on unstated dates) from
lumber purchaser by mill operator to log supplier held superior to prior tax liens on
theory the taxpayer had no property in the account. See discussion note 146 infra].
64 See text, supra notes 27 & 50, and H.R. REP., infra note 66.
65 See also discussion note 32 supra.
66 The House and Senate Reports contain the following statement:
• . . Various types of secured creditor interests already having, or given,
priority status over tax liens are specifically defined, and it is provided that
where those interests qualify under the definitions they are to be accorded
this priority status whether or not they are in all other respects definite and
complete at the time notice of the tax lien is filed. H.R. REP., supra note 5.
S. REP., supra note 5. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is submitted that where an interest does not qualify under the statutory definitions,
there can be no priority unless it is in all respects definite and complete at the time
notice of the tax lien is filed.
67 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(d).
68 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(d). It is of course necessary that a written
security agreement precede tax lien filing, and that the agreement protect the interest
in question under local law against a judgment lien creditor.
Note that this is a departure from the pre-1966 rule which viewed each advance
as a separate security interest when actually made. See Comment, Nonconsensensual
Liens Under Article 9, 76 YALE L.J. 1649, 1665 (1967). See also, United States v. Pay-
0-Matic Corp. 162 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 256 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958) [attorney's lien in condemnation suit held inchoate
under federal law until services fully performed]; and H.R. REP., supra note 5,
at 10, 45.
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it is immaterial whether there was any disbursement made within
Time 1 (before tax lien filing), but it is critical that there be Time
1 security. No provision is made under the 45-day exception of
section 6323(d) for after-acquired security. See examples "E" and
"F."
There is no requirement that these post-tax-lien-filing disburse-
ments be obligatory and no advantage under this provision merely
because they are. Obligatory or not, priority under section 6323 (d)
is cut off for disbursements made more than 45 days after tax lien
filing or after earlier actual notice of this filing. 9
A qualifying disbursement under the Internal Revenue Code
is defined as a parting with money or money's worth."0 Past con-
sideration is sufficient in all cases where it is sufficient under local
law.71 A promise to extend credit or to make a loan is not a "part-
ing with money's worth" under the Internal Revenue Code."2 Only
where a disbursement is required by the intervention of rights of a
third party (other than the taxpayer-debtor), does the Internal
Revenue Code accord additional protection to a secured party.78
The "Commercial Transactions" Security Interest and the
Protection of After-acquired Property74
The commercial transactions exceptions provide for after-ac-
quired security. 5 Disbursements under the commercial financing
subdivision of this section (whether as loan or purchase) must be
69 Some protection is accorded disbursements made obligatory by the intervention
of rights of a third party. See text following note 114 et seq. infra.
70 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 45; INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h) (1) (B).
71 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 11. S. REP., supra note 5, at 13.
72 Note the contrary rule of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(44) (a),
where a promise to extend credit constitutes value sufficient to permit attachment of
a security interest. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204.
73 See following note 134 infra, for discussion of specialized obligatory dis-
bursements.
74 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c).
75 A filed tax lien is not good against certain security interests coming into
existence after tax lien filing (because of post-tax-lien filing disbursements or acquisi-
tions) if the following conditions are met:
a. There must be a security interest protected under local law against a judgment
lien arising at the time of tax lien filing in
b. qualified property, as defined, covered by
c. a written agreement entered into before tax lien filing. INT. REV. CODE of 1954
§ 6323(c) (1)(B).
In addition, the agreement must constitute
a. a commercial transactions financing agreement,
b. a real property construction or improvement financing agreement, or
c. an obligatory disbursement agreement, all of which are defined. INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)(1)(A)(i),(ii),(iii).
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made before actual notice or knowledge of tax lien filing and not
later than 45 days afterwards, as under the 45-day exception of
section 6323(d). Commercial financing security may be acquired
by the taxpayer or otherwise become security only within 45 days
after the tax lien filing-Time 3 security on the accompanying
chart." See example "E."
Under the obligatory disbursements and crop, livestock, or con-
struction loan provisions, priority is recognized in property becom-
ing security more than 45 days after tax lien filing. The priority
accorded this (Time 4) security is illustrated by examples "C," "F"
and "I" on the accompanying chart. In addition, these provisions
are the only ones affording protection to (Time 4) disbursements
after actual notice of tax lien filing or 46 or more days after tax
lien filing (Time 2), except for interest and certain expenses, and
the superpriorities. See examples "G," "H" and "I."
1. The Commercial Transactions Financing Exception.77 The
purposes of the commercial transactions financing exception are to
permit the roll-over of inventory and accounts receivable for 45
days after notice of the tax lien is filed, and to protect the lender
or purchaser's security in after-acquired property for the same
period. 78 As a result of this provision, the lender need only check
the records every 45 days, rather than before each disbursement as
prudence would have counselled under prior law. However, the
agreement to make loans or to purchase commercial financing secu-
rity must have been made in the course of the lender's trade or
business. Accordingly, although manufacturers' or distributors' fi-
nancing on a customer's accounts receivable may be protected, a
family lender is not. The result is that his security must have come
into existence as such prior to tax lien filing. 9
Another qualification upon the availability of the commercial
financing exception to protect after-acquired security is that the
76 Limitations on the kind of property which may secure a holder against
a federal tax lien are discussed infra p. 59; see also Continental Fin. Inc. v. Cambridge
Lee Metal Co., 100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853 (1968), discussed in note 146 infra.
77 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2).
78 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 2, 8, 41, 42. S. REP., supra note 5, at 2, 8.
79 One other alternative to consider in the family secured loan area is to set up
the transaction as a gift. If the otherwise-debtor gives property to a donee prior to
the attachment of a federal tax lien, the "debtor" has no longer any property to
which the lien can attach. Zeddies v. United States, 357 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1966) [so
held, in absence of evidence that conveyance was fraudulent]. However, where a tax-
payer acquires property presumptively by gift, that property is subject to federal tax
liens filed against him. United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964). How-
ever, the price of a gift instead of a loan is loss of any interest deductions on pay-
ments made by the donor, who would otherwise be entitled to them as a borrower,
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 163.
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security must be acquired by the taxpayer-debtor in the ordinary
course of his trade or business." Ordinary business assets and non-
depreciable personal property held for investment or speculation
are frequently distinguished in federal tax law and it is possible
that some significance will be attached to the use of the word
"ordinary" in the tax lien priority context.8 ' However, the impact
of this qualification is minimized by the creation of a superpriority
(protection against a filed tax lien) for security interests in secu-
rities.82 This is the one class of property most likely to be found a
capital asset held for investment or speculation rather than an
ordinary business asset which qualifies as commercial financing
security. Real property and depreciable personal property used in a
trade or business are almost always considered ordinary business
assets, and thus could qualify as commercial financing (Time 3)
security for tax lien priority purposes. However, the circumstances
of the taxpayer's acquisition and holding of the asset would be
relevant in a close case, and intangible personal property is to be
suspect.
The commercial financing definitions must, of course, be satis-
fied:8 3 Is the financing agreement in question written? Does it assure
priority as to the security in question against a judgment lien
creditor under local law? Under its provisions, does the person
claiming priority agree to make loans (no binding commitment is
necessary) to the taxpayer to be secured by commercial financing
security84 or to purchase such security (other than inventory)?85
80 INT.'REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2) (A) (i),(ii).
81 The Code has long distinguished between capital assets and real or depreciable
personal property used in a trade or business. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 1221(2). The
latter were not initially qualified for capital gains treatment. In 1942 because of in-
come distortions arising from government requisition of property and war losses over-
seas, Congress allowed real and depreciable personal property to receive capital gain
treatment where the disposition created a gain and ordinary loss treatment if a loss
were created. Involuntary conversions of long-term capital assets and tangible business
property were lumped together and a net gain (capital) or loss (ordinary) reported,
under what is now INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 1231.
Unaffected by any of these distinctions was intangible personal property used or
acquired by a business: stocks, bonds, commodity futures, contract rights, and so on.
See, e.g., Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) [corn futures held
ordinary assets in the hands of corn products manufacturer]; Pridemark, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) [uncompleted contracts for prefabricated houses
in hands of dealer in such houses held ordinary assets].
82 INT. REV. CODE § 6323(b) (1) (A),(B), discussed in note 25 supra.
83 See H.R. REP., supra note 66, S. REP., supra note 66. See also discussion note
158 infra.
84 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2) (A) (i). Commercial financing security is
defined in INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2) (C) to include "(i) paper of a kind
ordinarily arising in commercial transactions, (ii) accounts receivable, (iii) mortgages
on real property, and (iv) inventory." H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 8, 41; S. REP., supra
note 5, at 708.
85 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2) (A) (ii).
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If the financing agreement does not meet these requirements at the
time of tax lien filing, there can be no protection for after-acquired
property (security) under this exception. Protection can only be
found elsewhere, such as in construction, crop and livestock loans
and obligatory disbursements,8 or as superpriorities s7
Under this section purchasers of commercial financing security
other than inventory are treated as lenders" as they are in the case
of accounts, contract rights, and chattel paper under the Uniform
Commercial Code. 9 The characteristic use of recourse provisions in
the factoring context makes the segregation of sales from secured
transactions hopelessly complex. Nevertheless, in the lien priority
context, it is desirable to mitigate the effect of unexpectedly being
treated as a secured party as a result of what was thought to be
a sale.
The tax lien priority statute provides purchasers (in substance
or form) a choice of priorities. Take for example a purchaser of
accounts receivable at the going discount rate. Such a simple pur-
chaser must perfect his interest against a subsequent purchaser
without actual notice, but having done so, he is protected to the
extent of the entire property covered by the purchase agreement,
regardless of when he is required to pay the price.90 As a lender,
he need only perfect his interest against a judgment lien arising
at the time of tax lien filing and otherwise qualify his interest under
the commercial financing exception's definitional requirements.9
However, his resultant priority will extend only to the "purchase
price" paid, plus interest and expenses 92 as for all other lenders. If
his priority is that of a lender, his protection is that of a lender also.
If he accepts the general priority rights accorded other purchasers,
his protection is that of other purchasers. The choice is his.
2. Real Property Construction and Improvement Loans.9 3 The
86 Id. § 6323(c) (3) or (4).
87 Id. § 6323(b).
88 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (1) (A), (2) (A) (ii), 2(D); 1 GiMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 10.5 (1965).
89 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(1) (b), except as provided in UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-104(f) (relating to sales as part of the sale of a business, assign-
ments for collection only, or transfers of contract rights to an assignee who is also
to do the performance under the contract].
90 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 42.
91 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (1) (B), (2) (D) ; i.e., having an interest in
qualified property which is perfected against a judgment lien arising at the time of
tax lien filing, and which is covered by a written commercial transactions financing
agreement.
92 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(a) [disbursements prior to tax lien filing]
(c), (d) [disbursements prior to actual notice and within 45 days after tax lien filing]
(e) [interest and expenses].
93 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3).
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purpose of this second type of commercial transaction is to permit
the completion of real property construction projects. The theory
is that the completed structure will be worth more to the United
States, as well as to the lender, after completion.94 For this reason,
the construction lender's protection is limited to cash disbursements
applied to the construction project.
The construction lender has priority over filed tax liens for two
kinds of Time 3 security: the first is "real property as to which the
construction or improvement has been or is to be made," or the
proceeds of the contract for such construction or improvement.9
The term "property" is nowhere defined in the 1966 amendments
nor in the Reports accompanying them. It is not clear whether
"property" includes fixtures which become a part of the property
under state law, as some have suggested.96 California law relating
to the priority of a security interest in a fixture as against a security
interest in the real property was unaffected by the enactment of the
California Commercial Code,97 and prior law afforded no priority
to the holder of the security interest in the fixture over the holder
of a security interest in the realty,98 absent a waiver by the senior
secured party.9 In other words, fixtures do become a part of the
94 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9. S. REP., supra note 5, at 9.
95 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)(3)(B)(i),(ii). A footnote to the House Re-
port on the Act states that "As to what constitutes property, it is intended that what
becomes a part of realty is to be determined by local law." H.R. REP., supra note 5,
at 11, note 2. However, "property" under the Act must have been that "with respect
to which the construction or improvement has been or is to be made," INT. REV. CODE
of 1954 § 6323(c) (3) (B) (i).
96 It should be noted that the term "fixtures" has never been clearly defined under
California law. See SENATE FACT FINDING COMM. ON JUDICIARY (1959-1961) SIXTH
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, Part I, The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 578
(1961); Horowitz, The Law of Fixtures in California--a Critical Analysis, 26 So.
CAL. L. REV. 21 (1952); Project 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 806, 931-38 (1961).
97 The official text of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE contains provisions defin-
ing security interest in fixtures (UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(1) (a)), deter-
mining priorities between competing security interests in fixtures (UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-313) and providing special rules for the place of filing financing
statements covering security interests in fixtures (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
401(1) (b)). The California version contains none of this. It makes Division 9 ap-
plicable "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in goods which are or later became 'fixtures' under the law of this
state," and goes on to leave the priority of an interest in the fixture vis-k-vis an
interest in the real property to California real property law, CAL. COmm. CODE
§ 9102(1)(c) (West 1964). The term fixtures is defined in CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 658,
660 (West 1954). See generally, WARREN, COVERAGE OF DIVISION 9, 3 CALIFORNIA
COMMERCIAL LAW, CONT. ED. OF BAR § 1.9 et seq. (1966).
98 Oakland Bank of Say. v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295, 191 P.
$24 (1920) [subsequent mortgagee of realty without knowledge of conditional sale of
fixtures granted priority over conditional vendor]. Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540,
6 P.2d 952 (1931) [prior mortgagee of realty granted priority over conditional vendor
of fixture, because removal of fixture would seriously impair mortgagee's security].
09 Such waivers are suggested and described in ROBINSON, CONSUMER AND EQUIP-
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property under California law. Nevertheless, the construction
lender's priority under new section 6323 over filed tax liens should
not be recognized with respect to fixtures, because "qualified prop-
erty" includes only the constructed property which the lender is
making cash disbursements to finance."° It should not, therefore,
include property, neither constructed nor improved, which the
lender did not finance.1 1
The long-range priority accorded the lender's security in the
constructed or improved property (or contract proceeds) does not
extend to other (Time 3) security already owned or subsequently
acquired by the taxpayer. As to Time 3 security and disbursements,
the construction lender may have the same protections accorded the
holder of a simple security interest0 2 and the commercial lender'08
providing the requirements of the applicable code sections are met.
If this additional security is itself being constructed or manufac-
tured, its value at the critical time of tax lien filing0 4 or 45 days
thereafter'01 will determine the extent of the lender's priority over
the tax lien. 0 6
This subsection protects only cash disbursements. 0 7  Thus,
suppliers of goods and services must look to other parts of the stat-
MENT FItNANCING, 3 CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL LAW, § 9.46 as something in the nature
of a covenant between the financier, debtor, existing mortgagees, beneficiaries under
deeds of trust, the owner, and any sublessors, that the equipment shall not be classi-
fied as fixtures. Ideally such an agreement would be acknowledged, would describe
the real property on which the equipment is located, and would be recorded. If the
chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor of the fixture is inferior to the construction
lender, little harm will be done the latter because of the failure of the construction
lender's special priority to extend to such property. Only where the party secured
in the fixture is not a cognizable purchase-money secured party and cannot otherwise
establish priority over the tax lien will there be a pioblem. In such a case, T (tax
lien) will be ahead of C (chattel mortgagee) because and to the extent C is inferior
to L (construction lender), both C and L having come into existence after tax lien
filing. Unless L can succeed as a simple security interest or bring himself within the
commercial financing priority, T will prevail.
100 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3) (B) (i). See note 95 supra.
101 Because of the deference shown purchase money security interests vis-h-vis
federal tax liens. See notes 126-27 infra. It is interesting to speculate on the circular
effect of applying conventional priorities doctrine, e.g., if L (land security) prevails
over F (fixture security) which prevails over T (tax lien), who prevails and for
how much?
102 INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323(d). See note 68 supra.
103 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2). See note 75 supra.
104 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(d),(h) (1).
105 Id. § 6323(c) (2).
106 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 95; H.R. 'REP., supra note 95,
and H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 41-42; see also W. PLumB & L. WRaiOT, FEDERAL TAX
LIENs, 90 et seq. (2d ed. 1967), and Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien
Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
81 HAv. L. REv. 1369, 1383 (1968).
107 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3) (A).
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ute for their priority unless they can secure payment from the con-
struction lender whose priority will thereby be expanded.10 8 Pro-
tected cash disbursements may be optional, and they may be made
with actual notice of the tax lien filing.10 9 They need not even be
made to creditors holding liens which prime the federal tax lien.
They may be made indefinitely-there is no 45-day limit-so long
as they are made to finance the construction of real property."0
Therefore, it is unlikely that construction funds diverted to the
taxpayer or shareholders of a corporate taxpayer will qualify under
this exception.
The construction lender must, of course, qualify his interest
under the definitional requirements of the statute."' He must have
entered into a written agreement to make loans before the date of
tax lien filing, and the agreement must encompass the construction,
improvement, or demolition of real property." 2 The security interest
claimed must be protected under local law against any judgment
lien arising at the time of tax lien filing." 8 However, unlike the
commercial lending priority, neither borrower nor lender must be
acting in the course of its trade or business to secure priority for
construction loans over filed tax liens.
The construction lender's priority is a generous one, partic-
ularly since the failing-contractor scenario usually involves trust
fund taxes collected from the contractor's employees. Frequently,
the United States has been forced to look to the 100 percent penalty
against persons responsible for the nonpayment of these collected
taxes as a means of effecting collection." 4
108 For example, there is a priority accorded holders of mechanic's and stop
notice liens. Id. § 6323(a),(h)(2). In addition, a superpriority (i.e. priority over
previously filed federal tax liens) is accorded persons holding liens on residential
property for small repairs. Id. § 6323(b)(7). See note 25 supra. See also Harman v.
Fairview Assoc., 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9187 (App. Div. 1969).
109 This is not expressly stated in the bill or in the Committee Reports. Never-
theless it is implicit in this subsection. See W. PLUMB & L. WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENs,
85, at note 81 (2d ed. 1967).
110 Funds not applied to the construction-such as excess funds pocketed by
the borrower-may not be accorded priority in repayment by virtue of INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3), in light of the purpose of this section. If such disburse-
ments were made, the lender might still be able to obtain priority in repayment to
the same extent as a holder of a security interest or as a commercial lender.
111 H.R. REP., supra note 66; S. REP., supra note 66.
112 INT. R.v. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)(3)(A)(i),(ii); INT. REV. CODE
6323(c)(1)(A); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 43. Hereafter, the terms "constructed"
or "construction" will be used in place of "construction, improvement, or demolition."
113 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (1) (A) (ii),(B) ; see discussion on note 26
supra.
114 Cf. in re Halo Metal Prods. Co., 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9202 (N.D. Ill.
1969). See Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1967)
[holding a surety in control of the taxpayer-contractor's funds and paying net pay-
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It is not surprising then, that when Congress opened the door
for priority of the construction lender, it required at the same time
that payroll financing include the contingent obligation to meet
withheld taxes. The employer remains, of course, primarily liable
for all payroll taxes, so that only on his failure to pay will the
payroll financier be liable under this new law.115
3. Crop and Livestock Loans."8 Loans made to finance the
harvesting of a farm crop or the raising of such a crop or of live-
stock or other animals are also accorded priority over filed federal
tax liens, regardless of when disbursements are made." 7 This priority
is accorded all disbursements to finance the raising or harvesting,
regardless of tax lien filing, or of actual notice of the filing. It is
necessary, however, that the written loan agreement be entered
into before tax lien filing, and that it create an interest protected
under local law against the lien of a judgment creditor arising when
the tax lien is filed." 8 In this instance, the disbursements need not
be made in cash, but may be made by furnishing goods and ser-
roll liable under INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6672 for the 100 percent penalty imposed
upon persons responsible for the nonpayment of collected taxes].
115 The statutory liability of persons paying or providing for wages is found in
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 3505, which provides in part as follows:
(a) Direct Payment by Third Parties.-For purposes of sections 3102,
3202, 3402, and 3403, if a lender, surety, or other person, who is not an em-
ployer under such sections with respect to an employee or group of employees,
pays wages directly to such an employee or group of employees, employed by
one or more employers, or to an agent on behalf of such employee or em-
ployees, such lender, surety or other person shall be liable in his own person
and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the taxes (together with
interest) required to be deducted and withheld from such wages by such
employer.
(b) Personal Liability Where Funds Are Supplied.-If a lender, surety,
or other person supplies funds to or for the account of an employer for the
specific purpose of paying wages of the employees of such employer, with
actual notice or knowledge (within the meaning of section 6323(i) (1)) that
such employer does not intend to or will not be able to make timely payment
or deposit of the amounts of tax required by this subtitle to be deducted and
withheld by such employer from such wages, such lender, surety or other
person shall be liable in his own person and estate to the United States in a
sum equal to the taxes (together with interest) which are not paid over to
the United States by such employer with respect to such wages. However,
the liability of such lender, surety, or other person shall be limited to an
amount equal to 25 percent of the amount so supplied to or for the account
of such employer for such purpose.
Subsection (c) provides for the crediting of amounts collected under this subsection
to the employer's liability.
Note that the burden of proving actual notice or knowledge is not specifically
placed upon the United States in proceedings under this section, as was done where
the issue involved is "the priority of a federal tax lien versus a competing lien or
interest." H.R. RP., supra note 5, at 14, 12. S. REP. supra note 5, at 14, 12.
116 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3).
117 Id. § 6323(c)(1)(A)(iii),(B)(iii). See Citizens Co-Op Gin v. United States,
69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9381 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
118 Id. § 6323 (c) (1) (A) (ii),(B).
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vices. 119 Where disbursements are made by the furnishing of goods
and services-such as the provision of seed or the use of a combine
-the priority extends to the reasonable value of these items.'"
Crop or livestock loans are secured to the extent of the crop
or livestock whose production or harvesting is being financed and
the proceeds of their sale; they may also be satisfied from any other
property qualifying for a simple security interest, if the agreement
provides.' 2 ' In terms of the chart, they may also be secured with
respect to Time 3 security under the commercial financing excep-
tion, to the extent they qualify' 22
4. Financing the Production of Other Personal Property Not
Provided For. There is no exception under the Internal Revenue
Code from the priority of a filed federal tax lien which expressly
allows the completion of inanimate personal property in the process
of manufacture or production. The only repair or improvement lien
recognized in the code with respect to personal property is an unin-
terrupted possessory lien.1'2  However, in competing with tax liens
against the manufacturer, a lender financing production on the secu-
rity of the goods in process and proceeds of a contract of sale may
make disbursements under the 45-day rule'24 and look to security
produced within 45 days after tax lien filing for disbursements made
within the same period and prior to actual notice of the filing,'125 to
the extent the relevant code sections are satisfied.
Under prior law, a purchase-money mortgagee was accorded
priority against a filed tax lien, on the theory that the taxpayer's
only "property" in the goods was the equity above that amount
owing the purchase money financier.' However, maintaining suc-
119 Id. § 6323(c) (3) (A) (iii).
120 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 43; see contra, W. PLUMB & L. WRIGXT, FEDERAL
TAX LIENS 86, 87 (2d ed. 1967) that disbursements in kind are protected to the extent
of their price.
121 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3) (B) (iii) ; see also discussion following
note 57 supra; H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 44.
122 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2); see also discussion following note 78
supra.
123 See discussion note 26 supra.
124 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(d).
125 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) [commercial financing exception].
126 In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1960) [on purchase-money theory,
priority accorded financier of manufacturer as to proceeds of contract of sale where
the assignment was made before work was performed]; Monroe Banking & Trust Co.
v. Allen, 286 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Miss. 1968), infra note 146, contra, Parlane Sports-
wear Co. v. United States, 359 F.2d 974, 977 (Ist Cir. 1966) [where assignment of
buyer's contract was made after work was completed]; cf. Fine Fashions, Inc. v.
United States, 328 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1964) [assignment of government contract
proceeds as additional security for payment of cost of material used in production
held ineffective against federal tax lien and levy on those funds in the hands of
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cessfully the position of a purchase-money mortgagee was not al-
ways easy. Such claims were frequently rejected where the assign-
ment of contract proceeds was only additional security, and where
it followed completion of the manufacture of the goods. 127 Never-
theless the purchase-money theory is still available and is helpful
to the lender or purchaser financing production.
When the taxpayer is the purchaser instead of the manufac-
turer, the lender financing production should be entitled to protec-
tion under the commercial financing exception outlined above.'2 8
There appears to be no further protection unless the lender canbecome subrogated to the manufacturer's possessory lien under locallaw. Subrogation is expressly acknowledged by the code as a valid
method of establishing a priority,129 but this may prove small con-
solation where the goods have been delivered to the taxpayer.
In cases where the tax lien is filed prior to the completion of
manufacture, one further resort is the District Director. Under the
Internal Revenue Code as amended in 1966, he has authority to
subordinate a federal tax lien in order to increase the government's
recovery under its lien. 130 He also can discharge property subject
to a federal tax lien if the government's interest in the property has
no value,' 3 ' if partial payment is made,3 2 or if the fair market value
of property which remains subject to the lien is at least double the
amount of the unsatisfied liability secured by the lien, plus prior
liens.3 3 Thus, a lender may find it advantageous to negotiate with
financier]; and Harbert Constr. Co. v. United Iron Works, Inc., 20 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d5463, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas., ff 9668 (N.D. Ala. 1967) [direction to purchaser to make
checks payable to taxpayer-seller's supplier held insufficient to create assignment effec-tive against federal tax lien]; Bebber v. Mills Lumber Co., supra note 26 [no employeelien]. See also infra note 146; Rev. Rul. 68-57, 1968 INT. REV. BULL. No. 6, at 24.127 Fine Fashions, Inc. v. United States, supra note 126; Parlane Sportswear Co.
v. United States, supra note 126; cf., Seaboard Sur. Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 855(9th Cir. 1962), supra note 4 [interest of non-purchase money assignee of government
contract held subordinate to subsequent federal tax lien]; but see United States v. Toys
of the World Club, Inc., 288 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1961) [dictum]; H.R. REP., supra
note 5, at 4 [priority of purchase money mortgagees undisturbed by the Act]. See
also, United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1957) [equitable vendor's
lien held ineffective against federal tax lien].
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE § 9.107(b) and Comment (2) identify the purchase
money security interest of a lender by the fact that present consideration is given toenable the debtor to acquire the collateral. See WARREN, PRIORITIES, 3 CAL. COMM.
CODE, CONT. ED. OF BAR (1966) §§ 4.32, 4.33, 4.34.
128 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2).
129 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 § 6323(i) (2); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 12, 50;
S. REP., supra note 5, at 14.
130 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6325(d) (2).
131 Id. § 6325(b) (2) (B).
132 Id. § 6325(b) (2) (A).
133 Id. § 6325(b) (1).
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the District Director for a subordination or discharge, where a
junior federal tax lien would prevent the lender from being secured
with respect to disbursements made more than 45 days after notice
of the tax lien has been filed, or after actual notice. Otherwise, his
security may be limited to the value of the goods in process at the
end of the 45-day grace period, for only to the extent of its then-
value is this security in existence for tax lien priority purposes."'
5. Obligatory Disbursements.'3 5 Certain persons obligated to
make future disbursements under an agreement entered into before
tax lien filing are accorded additional protection for disbursements
made after that date. The agreement must be in writing'
36 and the
obligor must have entered into it in the course of his trade or bus-
iness, 3 ' and his security interest in the property subject to his lien
must have been perfected at the time of tax lien filing against a
judgment lien creditor. 18 The agreement is not limited to ensuring
performance with respect to real property and may thus encom-
pass the manufacture or production of goods or the furnishing of
services, as well as the bare obligation to make payment.
The disbursements protected under this section are only those
required to be made by reason of the intervention of the rights of a
person other than the taxpayer.39 There is no requirement that they
be made in cash. Examples of such disbursements are those required
under a letter of credit, or a bonding agreement. 140 An endorser's
184 See authorities cited note 106 supra.
135 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (4).
136 Id. § 6323(c) (1) (A).
137 Id. § 6323(c) (4) (A).
138 Id. § 6323(c) (1) (B).
139 Id. § 6323(c) (4) (A).
140 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 9; S. REP., supra note 5, at 9. The House Report
contains the following statement:
The requirement that disbursements be made must arise on the happening of
an event beyond the obligor's control. This requirement must, therefore, be
triggered by the intervention of the rights of a third party, such as the good
faith reliance of a supplier of goods or a bank authorized to honor a letter of
credit on an issuing bank's obligation under a letter of credit. H.R. REP.,
supra note 5, at 44.
Accordingly, an obligation to the taxpayer-debtor alone would be insufficient to bring
a lender within the protections of INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (4).
An analogy may be drawn from the equitable lien cases to establish the good faith
reliance of a supplier of goods or services. E.g., cf., see under prior law McBain v.
Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 241 Cal. App. 2d 829, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1966) [sup-
pliers of labor and materials held to have priority over borrower and lender, with
respect to unexpended construction loan funds]. A third party beneficiary theory might
also be helpful; cf., CAL. CIV. ConE § 1559 (West 1954) ; Ralph C. Sutro Co. v. Para-
mount Plastering, Inc., 216 Cal. App. 2d 433, 31 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1963) [construction
loan agreement conditioning payment to contractor on proof of payment of laborers
and materialmen]. Note that real property construction lenders, however, need not
rely on the obligatory disbursements priority except to the extent their disbursements
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or guarantor's obligation would also come within the scope of this
section provided the endorsement or guarantee were made in the
course of that person's trade or business .'4  There is no 45-day
limit on the time within which the obligatory disbursements must
be made to achieve priority under section 6323 (c) (4). All qualified
disbursements may achieve priority over federal tax liens, regard-
less of when the latter are filed.'
The property which may secure these priority obligatory dis-bursements'43 includes property which may be security under the
general priority rule of section 6323(a). Also recognized is a secu-
rity interest in property acquired by the taxpayer at any time after
tax lien filing to the extent this property is directly traceable to the
obligatory disbursement.
Sureties receive the same protection as others making obligatory
disbursements except that additional property is available to satisfy
the sureties' priority. The protected sureties are those ensuring theperformance of a contract between the taxpayer and another per-
son. Their priority may be satisfied additionally from the proceeds
of the ensured contract;' and in the case of contracts to construct
or improve real property, or to produce goods or to furnish services,
any tangible personal property used by the taxpayer in the per-formance of the ensured contract. The sureties' agreement need
only qualify as an "obligatory disbursements agreement."
The additional security afforded sureties under this subsectionleaves undisturbed their rights of subrogation through an owner or
mechanic.145 However, subrogation is available only through one
other than the taxpayer, and is helpful only to the extent that per-
are made for purposes other than financing the construction or a contract for the con-
struction of real property. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)(3) (A). Examples of
other purposes might include the financing of the contractor's acquisition of tangiblepersonal property used in the performance of the contract. INT. REV. CODE of 1954
§ 6323(c) (4) (C).
141 H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 44.
142 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323 (c) (4).
143 Id. § 6323(c) (4) (B).
144 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)(4)(C). Sureties of performance under
contracts between the taxpayer and another person may look to tangible personalproperty which is used by the taxpayer in the performance of the ensured contract
regardless of when the taxpayer acquired the property, provided the surety holds a
simply perfected security interest in it. This provision thus dispenses with the 45-day
acquisition rules of the commercial lender priority provisions, INT. REV. CODE of 1954§ 6323(c) (2), a benefit not accorded others required to make obligatory disbursements,
who must trace their disbursements into the property it was used to acquire, and who
are not accorded special priority as to proceeds of the ensured contract, INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (4) (B).
145 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(i) (2).
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son either (1) prevents the taxpayer from acquiring any "property"
in the security in dispute14  or (2) holds an interest which itself
148 Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960), on remand, 10 N.Y.2d 271,
176 N.E.2d 826, 219 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1961) [state law imposed "trust" on construction
loan funds]; United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960) [same on
similar statute which did not impose trust].
The so-called "property" problem relates to a line of cases in which a direct con-
frontation of liens competing with federal tax liens was avoided upon the theory that
the federal tax lien could attach only where the taxpayer had "property," and where
it could be successfully argued that the competing liens deprived the taxpayer of any
property right in the disputed property. The theory has been applied almost exclu-
sively in the mechanic's lien area, and in purchase-money security cases. See, e.g., In re
Halprin, supra note 126; Gauvey v. United States, 291 F.2d 42, 47 (8th Cir. 1961)
[conditional vendor under contract of sale antedating filing of notice of tax lien, but
recorded thereafter] ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wall, 239 F. Supp. 433, 435
(W.D. N.C. 1965) [same, as to vehicle where Government could not bring itself within
the recording acts by detrimental change in position]. But see, Smith v. Hamilton,
54-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9292 (S.D. Cal. 1954) [secret lien of unpaid vendor found purely
equitable in California and therefore too insubstantial to prevail over subsequent
federal tax liens]. Note that purchasers have not always been able to bring themselves
within the "no property" rule, United States v. Cramer Indus. Inc., 349 F.2d 625 (5th
Cir. 1965) [erroneous property description in deed allowed subsequently-filed federal
tax lien to prevail over pre-tax-lien-filing purchaser, under recording acts]. Post-tax-
lien-filing purchasers are protected, if at all, under the superpriority exceptions, INT.
REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(b). And if a purchaser perfects his interest against a sub-
sequent purchaser without actual notice, he is now protected against the tax lien.
Engel v. Tinker Nat'l Bank, 269 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). The purchase-money
security interest was recognized as unimpaired by the Act in H.R. REP., supra note 5,
at 4; S. REP., supra note 5, at 4.
An equitable lien has never been considered equivalent to a purchase money
security interest. See discussion supra note 127. See also United States v. Masonry
Contractors, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9184 (S.D. Tex. 1968) [materialman's claim to un-
used materials held subordinate to federal tax lien on theory that state law only
afforded a right of repossession]; Continental Fin. Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co.,
Inc., supra note 127 [In re Halprin distinguished; court found that if United States
had no lien on the proceeds of an unperformed contract, neither did the assignee of
the embryo account receivable, and when the account ripened more than 45 days after
tax lien filing, the United States was entitled to priority]; Harbert Constr. Co. v.
United Iron Works Inc., supra note 126; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Foley, supra note
26. See contra, a group of recent cases which have seized upon the "no property" con-
cept to avoid deciding the priorities issues: Morrison Flying Serv. v. Deming Nat'l
Bank, 340 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1968) [assurance by paying agent to taxpayer's sub-
contractor held to create equitable interest valid against contract proceeds as against
subsequent tax liens]; Harter v. District Dir., 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d f 5091 (E.D.
Wash. 1968) [assignment to supplier of logs of amounts falling due lumber min (on
unspecified dates) from purchasers held to deprive taxpayer mill of property in the
debt to which prior tax liens could attach]; In re Swan-Finch Oil Corp., 279 F. Supp.
386 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) [creditor's suit to set aside fraudulent conveyance held to deprive
taxpayer of the property, so that tax liens could not attach to it]; Creditor's Exch.
Serv. Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Tex. 1967) [assignment of accounts
receivable (maturity dates not given) held to effect disposition of the taxpayer's prop-
erty, for purposes of the application of United States' insolvency priority]; Monroe
Banking & Trust Co. v. Allen, supra note 126 [assignment of proceeds of subcontract
for building construction to financing bank held to deprive taxpayer of any interest
in the contract. Tax liens filed after assignment and advances but before completion
of performance were held subordinate to the bank's assignment, even though the bank
wasn't a pledgee and had no mortgage lien]. The above cases generally misuse the "no
property" concept. The result in Monroe Banking is probably justified under the con-
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primes the federal tax liens. 47 Thus, the additional protection af-
forded the consensual security interest under the obligatory dis-
bursements and secureties' exceptions is substantial.
IN WHAT PROPERTY WILL A SECURITY INTEREST BE RECOGNIZED?
In General
The new statute itself is of little help in deciding what property
may be the subject of a security interest for tax lien priority pur-
poses. It refers alternately to "property in existence' n 48 and "prop-
erty subject to the lien imposed by section 6321" (the federal tax
lien) ." Assistance must be sought from commercial and bankruptcy
law, and prior decisions concerning federal liens and priorities. 5 °
Property recognized as such under state law will fail to secure
an interest against a federal tax lien in certain circumstances. First,
struction lender's priority provided in INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 § 6323(c) (3), but it
stretches credulity to say that an assignment of an executory contract as security for
a loan deprives the assignor of any property in it. Equitable liens are dependent onjudicial approval. They are not likely to succeed in the long run in scuttling of federal
priorities rules under the "no property" banner. The Morrison Flying Serv. and Harter
decisions could result in depriving the United States of rights guaranteed other cred-
itors under state law. However, recent experience in California state courts is persuasive
testimony to the allure of equitable arguments in lien priorities fights. See, e.g., McBain
v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 140, and it may require legislation to
stem the tide of decisions on this theory. The "no property" rule served well in "trust
fund" mechanic's lien and purchase money security cases. Elsewhere it has no applica-
tion. See United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1957) [equitable
vendor's lien]; see also cases cited in note 127 supra. See, under prior law Citizens
State Bank of Barstow, Tex. v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1940) [claim for work,
labor and materials; tax lien defeated subsequent assignment]. But see Farley v.
Turbett, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9727 (D.N.J. 1969).
147 See, e.g., mechanic's lien holders, as defined, completing the construction of
real property, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h) (2); a person holding a possessory lien
on tangible personal property for the reasonable price of a "repair or improvement,"
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(b) (5); a purchaser of tangible personal property at
retail and in the ordinary course of the seller's trade or business if he neither intends
nor knows that the purchase will hinder, evade or defeat the collection of any tax, INT.
REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(b) (3); or a person financing the construction or improve-
ment of real property, or a contract therefor, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (3).
148 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h) (1) (A).
149 Id. § 6323(d).
150 See discussion note 48 supra, regarding late perfection through late acquisition
of security. See also, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Rider Corp., 212 F. Supp. 457, 461-62
(D.N.J. 1963) [holding a federal tax lien took priority over chattel mortgagee and
conditional vendor of property destroyed by fire with respect to fire insurance proceeds
on the theory that the United States was the first to perfect its lien on the proceeds
after the fire occurred]; Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Iowa 1961) [bank's
lien under assignment held inchoate because amounts were not yet earned under the
assigned contract]; In re Hudon & Son, Inc., 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9517 (Mass. 1964)
[security interest in accounts receivable held inferior to federal tax lien, notice of
which was filed before the accounts came into existence and before purchase orders
received]; Dean Constr. Co. v. Simonetta Concrete Constr. Corp., 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
g 9253 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) [same].
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it may fail if the holder's right to look to the security is contingent
upon an event, such as taxpayer-debtor's default, or his acquisition
of rights in the property, if this event has not occurred at the time
of tax lien filing.' 5' In terms of the chart, supra, such property can-
not be Time 1 security, because the security interest is executory.'
52
The proceeds of certain property may thus fail to secure an inter-
est against a federal tax lien.153 Can property be commercial financ-
ing (Time 3) security if the contingency occurs within 45 days after
the date of tax lien filing? Under the commercial transactions ex-
ceptions, the filed federal tax lien is invalid unless the contingency
would defeat the interest under state law as against a judgment lien
arising at the time of tax lien filing or cause the definitional re-
quirements of section 6323(c) not to be met.' 54
Second, property will fail to secure a simple interest against a
federal tax lien if the holder must take any steps to perfect his in-
terest against a judgment lien under state law after the notice of
tax lien is filed. All events necessary to perfection must have oc-
curred prior to tax lien filing, in the case of a simple security interest,
which requires existing (Time 1) security.'55 Whether or not the
holder can perfect his interest in such property under the commer-
151 See discussion in text following note 54 supra, and note 152 infra.
152 The same rule is applied outside of the tax lien priority context, as well as
within it. Compare, Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 266, 115
P.2d 450 (1941) [assignment of rents as additional security] with Beeghly v. Wilson,
152 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1957) [insurance company's right to set-off, against re-
newal commissions of agent, costs incurred in garnishment proceeding held inchoate
until garnishment had been made]. See also Bank of America v. United States, 345
F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965). That subsequently acquired inventory is after-acquired
property under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, see Gordon, The Security Interest in
Inventory under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 49,
53-56 (1962). Note also that accounts do not come into existence until a debt is cre-
ated. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-204(2)(d) and 9-106; CAL. COMM. CODE
§§ 9204(2) (d) and 9106. See also P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C., Ch. 11 (1963). See contra, 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 45.5, at 1307 (1965). See also Continental Fin.
Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., supra note 76 [federal tax liens prevailed over prior
assignors of accounts receivable as to accounts coming into existence more than 45
days after tax lien filing. Only contract rights maturing into accounts within the 45-day
period were accorded priority]. Apparently contra, on facts not clearly stated, is
Creditor's Exch. Serv. Inc. v. United States, supra note 146.
153 Home Ins. Co. v. Rider Corp., supra note 150; but see Chrysler Corp. v.
Long & Long, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Mich. 1958) [chattel mortgage for present
consideration held choate with respect to property returned after tax lien filing but
arising out of assigned accounts receivable]. That returned goods are "acquired" when
they are returned, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(5)(a). And see Andrello
v. Nationwide Fire Ins. Co., 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9332 (App. Div. 2d 1968) [holding
mortgagee, as pledgee of fire insurance proceeds under agreement with no loss payable
clause, entitled to priority over United States under prior, but unfiled, tax liens].
154 Cases note 48 supra.
155 INT. REv, CODE of 1954 § 6323(h) (1),(d); H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 49.
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cial transactions exceptions depends upon whether the interest was
otherwise valid against a judgment lien creditor at the time of tax
lien filing. There is some room here for argument that perfection
within the 45-day period is sufficient if such perfection would pro-
tect the security interest under local law against a judgment lien
creditor obtaining a lien on the date of tax lien filing. The bare
statutory language supports the view that the "all events" test is
not imposed under the commercial financing exception until the
46th day after tax lien filing, and the Reports do not specifically
dispel this inference.' 56 But the conditions (discussed in the follow-
ing paragraph) for establishing a commercial financing security
interest must have been met prior to tax lien filing.
Third, property will fail to secure an interest against a federal
tax lien if the definitional requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code are not met on the date of tax lien filing.'57 Thus, as to com-
mercial financing (Time 3) security, the requisite written agree-
ment must have been entered into before tax lien filing.158 In addi-
tion, the security interest must come into existence within 45 days
after tax lien filing, unless some statutory exception is applicable.'59
Furthermore, property becoming security after tax lien filing under
the commercial financing exception must be either accounts re-
ceivable (not just accounts), inventory, real property mortgages,
or commercial paper acquired in the ordinary course of the tax-
payer-debtor's trade or business. 6° Intangible rights other than
accounts receivable must be embodied in "paper" within 45 days
after tax lien filing to secure an interest against the federal tax
lien.' 6 '
156 This relaxation of the "all events" test appears to have been intended by
Congress. The House Report provides that:
For purposes of subparagraph (A) of section 6323(c)(1), the written agree-
ment must be entered into before notice of the tax lien is filed, although such
agreement need not be recorded prior to that time. However, recordation in
accordance with the provisions of local law may be necessary prior to the
filing of the notice of lien in order to satisfy other provisions of subsection(c). H.R. REP., supra note 5, at 41; INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (2) (B).
157 See H.R. REP., supra note 66; S. REP., supra note 66.
158 The agreement must have been entered into, and it must have created a secu-
rity interest protected against a judgment lien arising on the date of tax lien filing.
The contrary decision in Peninsula State Bank v. United States, 201 So. 2d 466 (Fla.
1968), holding an assignee under a contract entered into within the 45-day period
following tax lien filing had priority over the tax lien, is submitted to be erroneous.
See contra United States v. Masonry Contractors, Inc., supra note 26 (dictum) and
INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c) (1).
159 Cases supra, notes 81 & 150, regarding the time within which security must
have come into existence. Statutory exceptions to the time rules might be INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 §§ 6323(c) (3) (crop, livestock, or construction loans), 6323(c) (4) (ob-
ligatory disbursements), 6323(e) (interest or expenses) or 6323(b) (superpriorities).
160 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(c)(2)(A) (i),(ii), and (c)(2)(C).
161 Id. § 6323(c) (2) (C) (i).
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Fourth, an interest not yet earned by performance is not prop-
erty which secures a simple security interest (Time 1) unless earned
prior to tax lien filing.' 62 It cannot be commercial financing security
unless earned within 45 days after tax lien filing under the com-
mercial financing exception, unless coming within some other ex-
ception.163 Although it is property under state law, it lacks the
requisite existence which is the hallmark of perfection under federal
law. The onus of this rule should not be too great in view of the
exceptions created for real property construction and improvements,
the superpriorities, and obligatory disbursements. In other cases,
a provision in the security agreement making the filing of a notice
of tax lien a default by the taxpayer-debtor will protect the holder
of a security interest, except in the case of the production of per-
sonal property.
1 64
The Californian's Dilemma
One problem of particular concern in California is Congress' in-
tended exclusion of general intangibles such as patents and copy-
rights from the definition of commercial financing paper. This ex-
clusion is not apparent from a reading of the statute, but instead
appears in the House Report. 5 Its potential significance is enor-
mous, because "general intangibles" is defined by reference to the
Uniform Commercial Code in which it is a residual classification
from which "contract rights" and "accounts" have been distin-
guished by rather narrow definitions. Hence, the list of assets so clas-
sified is an ever-growing one. In addition, although the draftsmen
may have thought (with California's Commercial Code draftsmen)
that relatively little financing was done on the strength of this
kind of security, in fact the opposite is true. Licensing agreements
162 Under prior law, see Seaboard Sur. Co. v. United States, 306 F.2d 855 (9th
Cir. 1962) [rights under unperformed construction contract]; United States v. Pay-O-
Matic Corp., 162 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 256 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958) [attorney's lien in condemnation suit held inchoate
under federal law governing priority of federal tax liens until the services were fully
performed]; Walker v. Paramount Eng'r Co., 353 F.2d 445, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1965)
[garnishment lien held inferior to subsequent federal tax lien with respect to a debt
arising from partially completed construction contract] ; United States v. Phillips, 198
F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1952) (dictum) ; Randall v. Colby, supra note 150.
163 See, under current law, Continental Fin. Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co.,
supra note 76 [holding contract right inchoate until matured into an account receiv-
able] ; United States v. Masonry Contractors, supra note 26; references note 159 supra.
164 See discussion supra.
165 The House Report provides:
Paper of a kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions ... does not in-
clude general intangibles (for example, patents or copyrights), as such intan-
gibles are defined in article 9-106 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. H.R.
REP., supra note 5, at 42.
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and royalty contracts are common security in this state.' Never-
theless, such security is vulnerable to attack by the government
because it was not intended to be commercial financing security.
An additional problem in establishing California security inter-
ests in intangibles as "paper of a kind ordinarily arising in com-
mercial transactions" is raised by California's broad exclusion of
general intangibles and certain insurance claims from the Uniform
Commercial Code requirements of perfection by possession or filing.
It may well be that "paper of a kind ordinarily arising.. ." will be
limited to paper in which a security interest is perfected by pos-
session or filing. Without possession or filing, a lien is secret. It
defeats creditors' expectations which are presumed shared by the
United States under the judgment lien creditor test. For this rea-
son, California's Commercial Code as it now stands may disqualify
this type of security as against a federal tax lien, unless the security
interest is fully perfected (a simple security interest in Time 1
security only) prior to tax lien filing." 7
CONCLUSION
It may well be that the newly-established certainty of con-
sensual lienors as respects their priorities may lead them to take
a greater interest in whether the United States is being paid its
taxes, as these become due. While consensual lienors may not be
certain of enjoying a priority for x-number of days, they must be
equally certain that thereafter, the priority will be cut off. This
certainty should encourage additional policing by the creditor of
his debtor's tax status. If the courts interpret section 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code in this spirit, the new law will have well-
served the interests of the self-enforcing system of taxation of which
we often boast.
166 See California State Bankers' Committee Statement approving exemption of
general intangibles from the filing requirements of Article 9 on the ground that such
assets rarely served as commercial security. CAL. SENATE 'FACT FINDING COM. ON
JUDiciARY, 6TH PROGRESs REPORT, PART 1, 568 (1959-1961) and Professor Marsh's
comment thereon at 643.
167 To the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE definition of general intangibles, the Cal-
ifornia version adds "any interest or claim in or under any policy of insurance is a
general intangible." CAL. COMM. CODE § 9106 (West 1964). Compare UNIFORM COm-
MERCIAL CODE 9-301 to -306 with comparable CAL. CoMM. CODE sections. The insur-
ance exclusion in the UNIFORM CO MERCIAL CODE allowed a federal tax lien to prime
a prior assignment in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Roller, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 71 9214
(D. Ariz. 1969).
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